Seemingly conflicting points of view concerning language instruction which are expressed in various teaching methodologies are reconciled in this paper. Key issues discussed include (1) the nature of linguistic rules and their relation to the "habits" of language use, (2) the role of grammatical theory in language teaching, (3) the nature of language learning, (4) a balance between an audiolingual habit theory and a cognitive code theory, and (5) some of the critical variables in language pedagogy. The author illustrates why the field of language instruction has become characterized by pedagogical uncertainty and concludes that the teacheres ability to manage learning behavior remains one of the most unexplored, unstudied variables in educational research. (RL) "4)
Introduction
The draft statement of Qualifications and Guidelines for Preparation of Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages now being prepared by a committee of TESOL makes reference at several points, quite .properly, to the desirability of having the TESOL teacher adequately equipped with a basic knowledge of relevant disciplines.
It is stated, for example, that the teacher "...should have insight into the processes of language acquisition as it concerns first and subsequent language learning and as it varies at different age levels." Later it is stated that the teacher "should acquire insight into the principles of educational psychology, linguistics, psycholinguistics, socioldgy and anthropology which he will use in facilitating the students' acquisition of the English language and of American culture."
As programmatic statements, these are acceptable and indeed laudable.
The problem comes when one tries to implement them. In a review of the "state of the art" done for the Center for Applied Linguistics, Ronald Wardhaugh (1969) states that the theory of foreign language teaching is characterized by "uncertainty." He alludes to the "current.ferment in those disciplines which underlie sccond language teaching, namely, linguistics, psychology, and pedagogy."; This statement echoes that of Chomsky (1966) , who characterized linguistics and psycholog y. as being in a state of "flux and agitation"--a state to which he himself had contributed it is suggested that transformational grammar has important insights for applied linguistics (James, 1969) ; then we are told that it is a complete failure in language teaching (Johnson, 1969; Lamendella, 1969) . First we are told that pattern practice is without any scientific foundation, then we are told that;.. pattern practice is indispensable and that there is no opposition between it and transformational grammar (or any other kind of grammar) after all (Brown, 1969) . Some writers assume that teaching method is everything; others tell us that method makes no difference.
In this bewildering interplay of diverse opinions and controversy, how is the language teacher going to.be able to draw any firm conclusions about how to teach?
That are the trainers of TESOL teachers going to tell them about linguistics, psychology, and pedagogy?
It has been some time since T hq,ve taken the opportunity to express myself on some of these questions, but in the interval I have also had the opportunity to rethink my position, sift the arguments of the various competing theories, and come up :with what I hope may be a more balanced view of the issues.
OUr field has been afflicted, I think, with many false dichotomies, irrelevant oppositions, weak conceptualizations, and neglect of the really critical issues and variables. When I summarized (Carroll, 1965) two extreme points of view in language teaching as being, first, the "audiolingual habit theory," and second, the "cognitive code-learning theory," I had no real intention of pitting one against the other. I was only interested in pursuing what each theory would imply if pushed to the limit. Indeed, even at that time I meant to suggest that each theory had a modicum of truth and that some synthesis needed to be worked out. Instead, the trend has b,en for points of view to become crystallized and polarized.
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In this paper I want to suggest how the apparently conflicting points of view may be reconciled; I want also to suggest that the debates that have raged in language teaching theory may have entirely missed some of the truly essential points. We have been hung up on..
issues that turn on semantics or misunderstandings. Some of the traditional wisdom in language teaching continues to be valid. We ought not to "throw out the old man with the bilgewater." At the same time we must guard against a "new orthodoxy" that may lead us down a garden path to failure.
I will orient my talk around a mother of key issues: the nature of linguistic rules and their relation to "habits" of language use; the role of grammatical/ theory in language teaching; the nature of language learning; the balance between an audiolingual habit theory and a cognitive code theory; and some of the critical variables in language pedagogy.
The False _Cpposition between "Rule-Governed Behavior" and "Habits"
In various writings, ChomskY has led an attack on what he claims to be "behavioristic" doctrines underlying older, "structuralist" views of language. In particular, he claims that language behavior cannot be conceived in terms of the notion of "habit"; rather, it must be thought of as "rule-governed behavior." In this attack, he seems to assume that "habits" are automatic sequences of responses to particular stimuli. A memorized sentence would be a "habit" for him. I remember that on one occasion, at a forum held at the Northeast Conference on the Teaching of Foreign Languages in 1966, he offered, as a kind of intuitive proof that language behavior is not a matter of habit, the fact that the first sentence of that day's New York Times had never been -4-written before--that it was entirely creative. As a psychologist, I
cannot see that this is any proof at all. If we were to take that sentence from the New York Times and decompose it into its various constituents, even using a transformational grammar to find its phrasemarkers and transformations, these constituents could be interpreted as manifestations of "habits" resulting from particular constellations of stimulus situations in the mind of the writer or in the material about which he was writing. What I am saying is that I do not find any basic opposition between conceiving of language behavior as resulting from the operation of "habits" and conceiving of it as "rule-governed." Perhaps it is simply that my conception of habit is different from Chomsky's. I would define a habit as any learned disposition to perceive, behave, or perform in a certain manner under specified circumstances. To the extent that an individual's language behavior conforms to the habits of the speech-community of which he is a member, we can say that his behavior is "rule-governed." For notice, what the descriptive linguist tries to do is to specify the manner and the circumstances older which certain classes of linguistic phenomena occur. Ordinarily, we think of these statements as rules, but they can equally well be thought of as statements of the conditions under which certain language habits manifest themselves in a given speech-community. As a matter of fact, linguistic rules are extremely limited; they specify only some of the conditions under which language phenomena occur; in general they take the form "if situation X is present (e.g., the necessity to place a certain concept in the subjectposition in a sentence), the language form must be thus-ana so (e.g., the verb must be passive)." They do not attempt to formulate the -5-conditions under which the contingencies of the rule occur. At any rate, I believe that the opposition between "rule-governed behavior"
and "habits" is false and specious.
I know that in saying this I subject myself to attack. I will be accused of not having read, or at any rate, not having understood, for example, Chomsky's (1959) There are a number of qualifications and details that would have to be discussed at length. Let me briefly mention some of these details.
In the first place I would emphasize that the notion of '!habit" is much more fundamental, psychologically, than the notion of "rule." A "rule" is simply a formal, usually verbal, statement of the conditions under which something is expected to occur or not to occur, usually under certain sanctions. As strih it is an abstraction or a construct in some sense independent of actual behavior. We are familiar with the fact that people can speak a language without any conscious knowledge or application of the "rules" that are said to underlie their language. A "habit," however, is a real thing that_somehow resides in
It is what he has learned. As language teachers we are trying to produce and change certain kinds of habits. If psychology has anything to say to language teachers, it will say it about "habits," not about "rules," except possibly as second-order phenomena. For example, rules have been formulated concerning the relations between the members of such pairs as sane--sanity, and vital--vitality, but if asked to.pronounce a derivative in -ity from a nonsense form such as fane, many Ss will still say ffeynity/, even though they will pronounce profanity in the usual way; they have no habit that reflects this rule, having learned sane and sanilti, profane and profanity, etc.
as separate items. In fact, the kinds of rules or habits they are really reflecting, in their behavior, are certain spelling-pronunciation rules, not rules relating words.
Third, I would point out thpt I do not exclude the notion of "knowledge" in discussing linguistic habits. The language user can become aware of his linguistic habits in various ways and in various degrees, and often he can report this knG.Arledge. He "knows" the meanings of many words, and he can recognize when a word is used in an "incorrect" or unusual grammatical function. Modern psychology views the individual partly as an "information processor," and on occasion the information he processes has to do with his linguistic habits.
But there are undoubtedly a large number of linguistic habits that never rise to the level of conscious awareness for the ordinary individual.
It seems to me to be an odd use of the verb to know when ibis said that the linguistic system is what the individual "knows" in order to understand and produce grammatical sentences.
In this whole matter of the relation of psychology to linguistic theory, much of what has been said by the proponents of the new orthodoxy can be regarded as a kind of "verbal overlay" (to use a phrase coined by Lamendella, 1969 ) that has little real relevance to the facts of language behavior or even to the goals of linguistics.
One aspect of psychology that has been used as a whipping-boy is the so-called S-R (stimulus-response) theory. To be sure, there have been varieties of S-R theory whose application may be too limited, like Watson's or Skinner's, but from some linguistic writings one gets the impression that there is no such thing as a stimulus, and no such thing as a response. Actually, psychology cannot possibly dispense with these concepts, and they have been refined in various ways.
The. S-R formulation is usually expanded to include an "0" (for "organism")
between the S and the R. The connection between an S and a response is seldom regarded as simple and automatic; it is modulated by the organism's past history, by other stimulus Conditions, etc. The stimulus need not be external, either. We usually distinguish between the nominal stimulus and the functional stimulus; a nominal stimulus, for example, might be a grammatically ambiguous sentence in its purely physical manifestation (either written or spoken), while the functional stimulus would be what the hearer or reader perceives it to mean. Moreover, the psychologist does not think of a response only in terms of a consequence of some specific stimulus. Nor does the response have to be defined in tems of a particular physical movementsaying a word, for example, for many purposes can be thought of as equivalent to writing the word.
Finally, the concepts of stimulus and response are not inextricably bound to the concept of reinforcement. Rather, psychologists are more generally concerned with the outcomes of a particular S-O-R sequence and its effects on subsequent sequences. One kind of outcome has to do with an individual's knowledge of the outcome. Current opinion is that knowledge of outcomes is a much more effective factor in learning than "reinforcement" of some particular response. This is in line with the view of the learner as an "information processor"
whi-.h is implied by nearly all the current work on human learning, and sometimes even in animal learning. Still, there appear to be certain classes of behaviors in which reinforcement theory is useful.
What seems to have happened is that because of Chomsky's attack For example, it is impossible to write, in the usual linguistic manner, rules about the proper use of the definite and indefinite articles in English. One must make an appeal to the communicative situation--to the perceptions and intentions of speaker and hearer.
To explain the fact that a speaker can use the indefinite article a (as in "I saw a movie last night") even when he has a perfectly definite thing in mind, we have to note that the speaker realizes that for the listener, this thing is still nonspecific when first mentioned.. However, this introductory use of the indefinite article permits either the speaker or hearer to assume that the thing mentioned is now specified and thenceforth to use the definite article (e.g., if
the speaker continues "The movie was about Russia" or if the listener asks "Did you like the movier). We can say in this case that the speaker's perception of the listener's state of knowledge is the functional stimulus to his choice of article. However, I suspect that extremely few speakers of English are aware of this "rule" or the habit that corresponds to it. I wonder how many TESOL teachers are aware of it when they try to teach the use of indefinite and definite articles.
In a recent essay in Language Learning, T. G. Brawn (1969) ,_the fact that subjects seem to have slOWer comprehension of passive sentences does not need to be accounted for by appeal to transformational rules; it can be accounted for, possibly, by pointing out that passive sentences are less frequent in language use and hence less familiar to subjects in psychological experiments. The fact'that they are ordinarily learned somewhat later than active sentences is possibly a factor, also the fact that subjects seem to possess an "expectancy" for active sentences.
Whether it would be in a theory of competence or in a theory of performance, or some combination -thereof, an adequate theory would include the statement of rules (corresponding to habits, along the lines I have mentioned earlier), having to do with how speakers encode meanings into communicatively acceptable utterances, and how hearers decode those meanings. One might suppose that transformational grammar is attempting to do this by specifying relations between "deep" and "surface" structure, if one assumes that "deep structure" is tantamount to "meaning to be encoded, or meaning to be decoded into." It is not clear,however, whether meaning is in fact encoded in the deep structure forms specified by transformational grammar. My prize example would be the famous sentence, "John is easy to please." Intuitively I would guess that the meaning being represented here is an attribute of John, "easy-to-please-ness" rather than some deep structure which we might verbalize as "For someone I collected a large number of such words with multiple grammatical functions and asked my subjects to use them in sentences. A striking result of this part of the study was that in most cases, subjects had strong tendencies to use each word in a particular part of speech, even though if asked to use the word "in another way" they would sometimes use it in another part of speech. For example, the word MILL was used 100% of the time as a noun by those 3rd graders who could use it correctly at all, and 89% of the time by 6th graders. Only 12% of the 3rd graders, and 25% of the 6th graders, changed part of speech in giving a second sentence.
Furthermore, 76% of the 3rd graders, and 70% of the 6th graders, marked "wrong" the usage of the word in the sentence "Before class, children often mill in the halls," although of course most of the children (71% of 3rd graders, 92% of 6th graders) marked it "right" in the sentence "The children walked to the mill near the river."
From such findings, I conclude that a component of a child's competence in the English language is his "knowledge" of the lexicogrammatical information associated with each word--knowledge that could also be regarded as corresponding to a series of "habits" of various strengths to perceive the word in one or another part of speech and apprehend an associated meaning. I also conclude that for a large number of words, this lexicogrammatical knowledge is seriously defective in children as compared to that of the educated native speaker, and that this deficiency is possibly a serious and little recognized source of children's difficulty in comprehending language. Incidentally, this may be an interesting case of habit interference. A child's habit of understanding the word MILL as a noun appears to interfere with his comprehension when it is used as a verb.
I should think that information of this sort would be of interest and use to TESOL teachers. (It is contained in a report that I have submitted to the U.S. Office of Education and that will presumably show up in the ERIC system shortly.)
On Language Learning
The "new orthodoxy" in linguistics and psycholinguistics has made certain statements that may have made second language teachers almost despair of their profession. I refer to the claim that the acquisition of a first language depends to a great extent on some "innate" language ability whereby language is "acquired," not learned, by some mysterious process of "hypothesis testing." Certain writers go so far as to suggest that some ground-form of natural language is, so to speak, "wired in"
to the human brain. It is also suggested that there is a critical period for language acquisition that lasts only until about the age of puberty, with in fact a decline of language learning ability from about the age of 5 or 6 up to puberty. It Is true that these writers carefully leave open the possibility that people can learn asecond language after puberty, but they suggest that second-language learning is different in kind from first-language learning.
What may make second language teachers despair is that the process of ,language acquisition, whether the first language or another, is depicted as so mysterious, and so different from ordinary learning, that they could never hope to compete with these processes.
In some measure, we may agree with this new orthodoxy. We can grant that there is indeed a large biological component in first language acquisition--that even though chimpanzees have been taught impressive language-like performances, those performances are nothing like those of the average human child. We can grant that the human child has a very complex and well-differentiated brain and that language is acquired in step with the maturing of that brain. The evidence for a "critical period" and a decline in language acquisition ability during the middle school years is not strong, however, and even if there is some decline I am not persuaded that one must appeal to biology to explain it. An alternative hypothesis about this decline is that it is due to the consolidation of the habits established in primary language acquisition and their interference with the acquisition of new habits. Further, it may be that the large individual differences in foreign language aptitude that can be observed reflect individual differences in the rate of this decline.
My chief concern about the claims of the new orthodoxy, however, is that it underplays the role of learning, learning of the kind we know something about. It must be the case that in some sense children "learn" their language by observation, modeling, imitation, and similar processes.
In fact, there is accumulating evidence that children learn language, at least in part, by processes that resemble those that can be studied in the laboratory, and that in some respects they are "taught" their language.
It has been observed, for example, that mothers tend to simplify their language when speaking to their young children.
Common observation would suggest that people can and do "learn" second languages by normal learning processes--not necessarily by . 16
they are the basis of successful programs of "behavior management" as practiced in some kinds of institutions, such as those for delinquents and the mentally retarded, and even in some regular schbol programs.
But the current interest of psychologists studying human learning is in the investigation of basic processes of memory and concept formation.
These studies assume that the individual has the capacity to perceive language stimuli, to "register" them in memory in some way--initially in what is called short-term memory and later in a long-term memory storage--and to "process" the information thus registered in order to make inferences about its nature and structure or in order to make new, seemingly "creative" responses in conformity with those inferences.
They have been studying the factors that convert short-term memories into long-term memories, and the factors that enable the individual to derive inferences about his perceptions. For example, "rehearsal" (e.g., repeating
words to oneself) is one of the processes that appears to convert shortterm memories into longer-term memories. It is out of a psychology of this sort that I believe a psychology of language learning and use can be fashioned.
In fact, some of the elements of such a psychology have been lying around for a long time.
Audiolingual vs. Cognitive-Code Learning?
From all of the above, one can see that I do not believe that either a pure "audiolingual habit theory" or a pure "cognitive code-learning theory" is a correct and comprehensive one. Let us look at the merits and demerits of the theories that we want to synthesize.
In thinking about the audiolingual habit theory, we should first note that an incidental aspect of this theory was that it directed attention to a particular objective of language teaching, namely the aural-oral objective.
This was a salutary emphasis, but it had little to do with language learning theory per se. If we are concerned with habits, it wouldn't matter whether they were formed in a spoken or written mode. Studies such as that of Scherer and Wertheimer (1964) have adequately laid to rest the idea that there is any marked advantage in starting with aural-oral teaching when a reading objective is to be attained. As I have commented elsewhere (Carroll, 1966) the Scherer-Wertheimer study shows mainly that students learn (if anything) precisely what they are taught, or at least that transfer of learning is a two-way street between aural-oral and reading-writing skills.
From the standpoint of methodology as such, the emphasis of the audiolingual habit theory was upon the formation of habitsthrough practice and repetition. It re-introduced the pattern-practice drill that has been the bane of so many students and teachers. Now, language behavior is partly a matter of habits--habits of perceiving, knowing, and performance.
What was wrong with the audiolingual habit theory was its incorrect assumptions about what kinds of habits to form and how to form them. It assumed that the habits that had to be formed related, for example, to the substitution of words in slots in sentence patterns or to the transformation of On the formation of habits, the audiolingual theory assumed that practice arid repetition were the crucial factors. But it was found long ago in psychology that practice and repetition are not crucial in learning, although they have certain roles to play. Successive repetition of the same response is,in fact, generally the wrong way to "stamp in" a habit;
there are few kinds of learning where this is effective. Evocation of the response on a number of aperiodic, widely-spaced occasions, with interpolation of different material in the intervals, is a much more effective method of strengthening a habit, but such a method has been insufficiently employed in pattern drills.
-19-Another important principle of learning that was often ignored in methods based on the audiolingual theory was the role of feedback and correction, or "trial and error," in its nonpejorative sense. In the language laboratory, students were too often permitted to repeat errors and thus to "learn" th6Ta, or if they were corrected, there was insufficient attention to evoking the correct response on another occasion or to explaining the nature of the error and how to correct it.
Now consider the cognitive-code-learning theory. It does have the merit of trying to give the student a knowledge and comprehension of the facts and formal rules of the language--a knowledge that can indeed be of help in guiding the formation of appropriate language habits, but only when appropriate opportunities are given to form those habits along the lines I have just mentioned. Not only was there the danger that a cognitive code-learning procedure failed to provide enough of these opportunities, but there was also the possibility that the facts of the language were presented in inappropriate or hard-to-understand ways.
For example, the presentation of a complete verb paradigm is a dubious way of helping the student to form morphological habits because the task of reproducing a paradigm has little resemblance to anything in actual language use. (I don't mean to rule out all use of verb paradigms; I am simply suggesting that presenting a verb paradigm is not sufficient to produce the learning desired.)
The presentation of the "facts of the language" must take account of the student's readiness to absorb them; also, it must be done with an awareness that a variety of concrete examples must be given to illustrate and reinforce abstract'rules. Research on inductive vs. deductive teaching methods indicates that neither method alone is adequate; for effective teaching, there must be considerable alternation between rules and examples.
It hardly matters whether one starts with the rule or the example, as long as this alternation exists.
Contrastive linguistics and error analyses based on it can play a definite role both in the organization and preparation of language teaching materials and in the day-to-day presentation of "language facts" to the student.
But presentation of contrastive facts is best done, according to the kind of synthetic theory I am elaborating here, in the context of statements like "When you want to express meaning X, you do it in manner
A, but when you want to express meaning Y, you do it in manner B," emphasizing the stimulus conditions that control the different usages rather than merely pointing out a contrast between language forms.
In the teaching of phonology, a cognitive habit-formation theory would recommend: "Do as much explanation and coaching as you can as to how the foreign sounds are to be recognized, discriminated, and articulated, but at the same time keep shaping the responses by feedback, correction, and practice procedures." Relevant research studies supporting this recommendation are now available from. work of Henning (1966) and Catford and Pisoni (1970) .
Pedagogy* and the Teacher
Much of what I have said about teaching procedures is in no way new.
The kinds of things that I believe a cognitive habit formation theory recommends be practiced have long been the property of good language teachers, from the days of Gouin, de Sauze% Palmer, Sweet and other pioneers.
Teachers need to be constantly reminded of these practices, however, because they tend to develop, under the pressure of new fads and theories, a kind of professional panic and anxiety about their work. Also, it is easy to neglect certain practices, such as giving proper feedback and correction to every student, when there are too many students or when there are too many distractions of an administrative character.
In language teaching, as in other kinds of instruction, probably the critical factor in success is in managing the learning procedures of the student in such a way that at any given stage of learning the student is learning just what he needs to learn, being given the appropriate strategy for that lealming to take place, and being properly reinforced in that learning. Any extreme, one-sided theory of language teaching tends to distract the teacher from his task and make him neglectful of certain essential operations in teaching. This is perhaps one of the reasons why comparisons between different teaching methods and procedures are seldom productive of any large average differences favoring one method or another. In the "Pennsylvania study" conducted and reported by Smith (1970) , a large component of the variance was associated with the teacher, quite apart from method or material. I have reason to believe that this teacher variance reflected the extent to which the teacher was able to manage and maintain appropriate student learning behavior along the lines I have indicated--even though this was a variable that was never directly studied or observed in the Pennsylvania investigation. In fact, even though there has been considerable research on "teacher behavior," that research has focused on such things as "classroom climate" and student-teacher interaction patterns, largely neglecting the teacher's ability to manage learning behavior. Thus, the teacher's ability to manage learning behavior remains one of the most unexplored, unstudied variables in educational research.
